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The growth of inequality over the past half century is closely connected to the rise of neoliberal policies and institutions, the latter of
which shield capital from state actions that might limit wealth accumulation. Economic nationalism since the global financial crisis
has slowed or even reversed this, yet this same era has seen the emergence of a new form of instrument in the neoliberal mold, in a
stronghold of state sovereignty: taxation. Undermandatory binding tax arbitration, states cede sovereignty over the interpretation of
international tax agreements to panels of transnational tax adjudicators. Focusing on the pivotal role of the United States, we use
historical documents, including from the congressional archive and interviews with key actors to ask why tax arbitration emerged
late in the neoliberal era, and at a counterintuitive time. We demonstrate that this outcome is the result of instrumental business
power driving a process of incremental change through layering, to overcome states’ preference to retain sovereignty. This
experience sheds light on the historically structured ways that business power constrains sovereignty in an era of high inequality.
From [the business] point of view… a binding arbitration system
would have a number of important advantages … [but] the
adoption of such a procedure would represent an unacceptable
surrender of fiscal sovereignty.
—OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 1984
We are about to make tax treaty history! Before you lies the first
ever multilateral instrument capable of amending bilateral tax
treaties … [This is] the largest, and fastest, rewriting of the
international tax rules in a century … [it] gives you the tools
needed to implement mandatory binding arbitration.
—Angel Gurria, OECD Secretary General, 2017
T
he growth of inequality over the past half century
is closely connected to the rise of neoliberal
policies and institutions, the latter of which
shield capital from state actions that might limit wealth
accumulation. Economic nationalism since the global
financial crisis has slowed or even reversed this, yet this
same era has seen the emergence of a new form of
instrument in the neoliberal mold, in a stronghold of
state sovereignty: taxation. Under mandatory binding
tax arbitration, states cede sovereignty over the inter-
pretation of international tax agreements to panels of
transnational tax adjudicators. Focusing on the pivotal
role of the United States, we use historical documents,
including from the congressional archive and inter-
views with key actors to ask why tax arbitration
emerged late in the neoliberal era, and at a counter-
intuitive time. We demonstrate that this outcome is
the result of instrumental business power driving a
process of incremental change through layering, to
overcome states’ preference to retain sovereignty. This
experience sheds light on the historically structured
ways that business power constrains sovereignty in an
era of high inequality.
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We are in the midst of a quiet revolution in the
governance of corporate taxation. At a time when eco-
nomic nationalism is undermining longstanding institu-
tions of international cooperation, states are increasingly
ceding sovereignty over the interpretation of international
tax agreements from domestic courts to panels of trans-
national tax adjudicators. Nowhere is this change more
stark than in the United States, which opposed inter-
national tax arbitration until the mid-2000s, but now
embraces it so enthusiastically that it has made it an
essential quid pro quo if foreign governments are to have
greater tax jurisdiction over U.S. digital firms (Bulusu and
Ali 2019). This development is consistent with a trend
across global governance in recent decades through which
states enter into enforceable, sovereignty-constraining and
pro-capital commitments. Yet the timing is a puzzle, at a
moment when such institutions are meeting resistance
from economic nationalism. Furthermore, the inter-
national tax regime is generally characterized as strongly
resistant to such radical encroachment on sovereignty. We
reconcile these contradictions by focusing on how advo-
cates of neoliberal reform pursue change incrementally.
For over a decade, multinational enterprises (MNEs)
operating in the United States and Canada have been able
to use binding international arbitration panels to overturn
tax assessments raised by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) and its Canadian equivalent. In 2017, more than
two dozen countries agreed to adopt similar rules into their
bilateral tax treaties. Non-state private adjudicators are
now empowered to issue binding opinions settling thorny
distributional questions about which countries get to tax
which bit of multinational capital and by how much. This
transfer of power away from states was not accomplished
through deeply integrated regional bodies such as the
European Union—which has itself had an ambivalent
relationship with tax arbitration—but through the decen-
tralized regime for global taxation built around the
OECD. The countries now signed up to the arbitration
standard span multiple continents and many, such as the
United States and Japan, had previously opposed it.
This is, on the face of it, a familiar story of a neoliberal
capitalist order that gives transnational capital ever more
rights over states. Constraints on states’ ability to tax
MNEs can be seen as part and parcel of a political
economic framework designed to “encase” markets,
shielding them from the vagaries of national democratic
politics (Gill 1998; Slobodian 2018). Indeed, arbitration
forms part of a new discourse of “tax certainty” that seems
precisely to reflect this trend (IMF and OECD 2017). In
other economic policy areas, states have for decades
opened themselves up to transnational adjudication.
Through investor-state dispute settlement, they allow
private companies to sue them outside of national courts
over a wide range of domestic environmental, health, and
other policies (Tucker 2018). Similar litigation risks are
present in the state-to-state proceedings at the World
Trade Organization (Davis 2009). And a wide range of
regional and subject-specific courts now monitor states’
activity behind and within national borders (Alter,
Hafner-Burton, and Helfer 2019).
We contend that the encroachment of neoliberalism
into matters of corporate taxation operates differently. For
a start, the timing of this move is counterintuitive. It
coincides with an era of popular outrage at inequality in
the wake of the 2007–2009 financial crisis (Boushey 2019;
Saez and Zucman 2019). Chief among these grievances is
the unfairness of an economic system that allowed wealthy
corporations and elites to pay little to no tax. Social
movements, journalists, and legislators have brought
attention to particularly egregious tax avoidance practices
by technology firms such as Google and Amazon and the
details of massive data leaks like the Panama Papers
(Vaughan 2019). Governments responded at first with
intensified cooperation to tackle tax avoidance and eva-
sion, but more recently many have instituted new unilat-
eral taxes that respond to popular pressure but risk the
integrity of the century-old institutions of global tax
cooperation (Christensen and Hearson 2019; Mason
2020). Thus, economic nationalism is jeopardizing global
tax cooperation, just as it has the World Trade Organiza-
tion and European Union. This seems like an odd time to
be giving transnational actors more enforceable rights over
states.
Furthermore, the post-crisis outcry over tax avoidance
reinforces a longstanding sentiment that taxation is special,
the last bastion of unencumbered state sovereignty. New
constitutionalism, a concept closely related to neoliberal-
ism, draws an analogy with the logic of liberal democracies,
in which the constitution is designed to protect minority
groups from the “tyranny of the majority” (Gill 1998).
Thus, in the global political economy, new constitution-
alism shields capital from the impact of democratic polit-
ics. This sits uneasily with taxation, which is seen to be at
the heart of the emergence and practice of democratic rule
(Goldscheid 1958; Schumpeter 1918; Tilly 1992). This is
one explanation for why international governance institu-
tions in the area of taxation entail significantly less pooling
of sovereignty than others: many scholars have argued that
the growth of tax havens in recent decades was due to states
being unable or unwilling to build an international regime
that impinged on their autonomy over fiscal affairs (Palan
2003; Rixen 2011; Sharman 2006).
We seek to understand how the transnational neoliberal
project has encroached into an area of policy—international
taxation—that had previously seemed immune. To gain a
granular picture of U.S. and international political dynam-
ics, we read dozens of congressional committee hearings
from 1918 to the present. We supplemented these with
historical documents drawn from other governmental arch-
ives, and with specialist media reports. We also conducted
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interviews and informal discussions with thirteen individ-
uals who had been involved in tax arbitrations or the
negotiation of arbitration provisions.2
Building on the business power literature, we demon-
strate a decades-long incremental exercise of instrumental
and discursive power that persuaded states to accept an
institutional change they had long resisted, which bore
fruit at a moment when it was least expected. Because
businesses’ interests are served by global cooperation,
rather than pure competition, their structural power
through capital markets was too blunt a tool to achieve
this on its own. Meanwhile, states’ attitude towards tax
arbitration must be understood in the context of its
ambiguous relationship with sovereignty preservation,
because arbitration is simultaneously a loss of judicial
sovereignty and a means of reinforcing other
sovereignty-preserving elements of a regime.
Our analysis contributes to historical institutionalist
scholarship by demonstrating how processes of layering
can take place under the surface, leading to changes in the
observable policy environment at unexpected moments.
In particular, when businesses can sell major reforms as
reversible experiments that may make it easier for a given
regime to deliver on its original mandate, the stakes in
entering into non-binding judicialization can seem lower.
Then, when the experiment generates problems of its own,
calls for a rationalization and more efficient dispute reso-
lution can seem like commonsensical solutions—rather
than the power shifts they are. These pathways towards
least likely outcomes can serve as warning signs for gov-
ernments at a time of pandemic and economic crisis that
may fundamentally reshape governance institutions in
lasting ways.
Neoliberalism and the Taxation of
Multinational Companies
When we think of corporate tax policy in the neoliberal
era, typically we think of a “race to the bottom” over tax
rates. Some contributions to political science literature
explicitly operationalize it in this way (Hakelberg and
Rixen forthcoming; Swank 2006). For sure, the neoliberal
era has profoundly affected the politics of the tax state, in
line with the “Washington Consensus” prescription of
lower rates and broader bases (Williamson 1990). The
tax systems of Western states have become less redistribu-
tive than in the Bretton Woods era (Saez and Zucman
2019). Nonetheless, tax competition literature finds that
domestic social and political factors, such as longstanding
norms and political partisanship, act as scope conditions
for the strategic interaction between states (Basinger and
Hallerberg 2004; Jensen and Lindstadt 2012; Plümper,
Troeger, and Winner 2009; Swank 2006). Since the
financial crisis of 2007–2009, the race to the bottom
among OECD member states has slowed as these coun-
tervailing pressures have intensified, and states have begun
to work together to tackle tax avoidance and evasion
(Hakelberg and Rixen forthcoming).
But neither neoliberalism nor the politics of corporate
taxation can be reduced to structural power. We refer to
neoliberalism here in the sense described by Quinn Slo-
bodian (2018), as the creation of a web of global institu-
tions that “encases” global markets, including for direct
and portfolio investment. This requires the creation by
states of a particular type of strong institution, which
protects markets from interference by national-level
democratic politics—those “countervailing pressures”
against tax competition:
The real focus of neoliberal proposals is not on the market per se
but on redesigning states, laws, and other institutions to protect
the market…What neoliberals seek is not a partial but a complete
protection of private capital rights, and the ability of supra-
national judiciary bodies like the European Court of Justice
and the WTO to override national legislation that might disrupt
the global rights of capital. (6-15)
This view of neoliberal globalization has much in
common with the literature on “new constitutionalism,”
under which governments have agreed to be bound by
rules that “confer privileged rights to citizenship and
representation on corporate capital and large investors,”
(Gill 1998, 23). This literature emphasizes the emergence
since the 1980s of a “de facto constitutional governance
structure for the world market” accompanied by “specific
locking-in mechanisms” that make it harder for states to
undo their institutional commitments (Gill and Cutler
2014, 7). As David Schneiderman describes, “rules for the
protection of FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] have
emerged as … an important component of the new
constitutionalism to protect the interests of capital”
(Schneiderman 2000, 759).
Long before they worked together on tax avoidance and
evasion, states were cooperating to create just such rules.
While tax rates are important to investors, in practice amix
of legislative, administrative, and judicial elements con-
tribute to the tax environment (see for example Maffini
2015). Stability and cross-jurisdictional consistency, in all
three branches of government, can be as important to
investors as the tax rate (IMF and OECD 2017).
Recognizing this, states have created a regime based on
two instruments: transfer pricing rules and tax treaties.
Both have diffused widely, in part a product of tax
competition (Barthel and Neumayer 2012; Eden, Dacin,
and Wan 2001; Hearson 2021). Transfer pricing rules
dictate how the profits of multinational firms are attrib-
uted to the countries in which they operate. Firms are
treated as collections of separate affiliates, trading with
each other at free market prices (the “arm’s length
principle”). Transfer pricing is a matter for sovereign
domestic tax law, but in practice national rules are highly
standardized because most countries adhere to the
OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Bilateral tax
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treaties, for their part, are legally binding agreements that
divide taxing rights over cross-border economic activity.
They are heavily influenced by OECD and UN templates,
but states retain the right to decide with whom they
conclude treaties, and on what terms.
The global regime for corporate taxation is thus an
incomplete constitutional project: a patchwork of agree-
ments that create standardized, enforceable rights for
transnational capital, while preserving sovereign auton-
omy over most aspects of tax systems. One key aspect of
this autonomy is over the interpretation of domestic and
international rules, which continue to be enforced by
domestic courts. Taxpayers frequently disagree with rev-
enue authorities’ assessments of their tax liability—for
example with the value of a transfer price or with the
characterization of transaction by reference to treaty pro-
visions. Worse still for MNEs, if two countries’ revenue
authorities apply treaty or transfer pricing rules differently,
they may face “double taxation,” an overlapping claim to
tax the same income from both countries concerned. In
such cases, the taxpayer can challenge the assessment, but
only through national courts. Disputes over the interpret-
ation of tax treaties and transfer pricing rules are a huge
area of tax law throughout the OECD and G20
(Baistrocchi 2017).
One drawback of enforcing international agreements in
domestic courts is that the court is only concerned with the
tax laws of its own country, not with the interactions
between different states’ tax systems that create double
taxation (Christians 2011). Nor can it force a foreign
revenue authority to agree. Tax treaties contain an instru-
ment to fix this, the mutual agreement procedure (MAP).
MAP is a “semi-diplomatic” process to resolve individual
disputes on the application of a treaty (French Tax
Administration 2017). Where revenue authorities dis-
agree, it allows the affected taxpayer to force their “com-
petent authorities” to the negotiating table. It is a soft tool
to discipline states. According to John Harrington, a
U.S. Treasury official:
Typically, a dispute under the tax treaty comes up because the
taxpayer has determined that one of the governments isn’t taxing
consistently with the treaty. So, it goes to the competent author-
ity. In the United States, the U.S. taxpayer is going to typically go
to the U.S. competent authority and say, “This other country
isn’t engaging properly.” (U.S. Congress 2007, 33-34)
As one partner in a tax law firm in an OECD country
explained, in a recent case they had filed for MAP through
a treaty partner, “to try to force [this country] to see sense.
We’re using MAP as a tactic to force [the tax authority] to
be more reasonable” (Interview 5).
But until the developments explored in this article,
businesses’ rights ended there. They could not force
either state to agree. States retained the ultimate right of
their judicial and executive branches to interpret their
international obligations. It is a common complaint
from businesses that governments’ participation in
MAPs is not in good faith. They can reject requests
to commence MAP discussions, and enter into “pack-
age deals,” where individual cases are traded off against
each other rather than treated individually (Clayson,
Snodgrass, and Young 2017). Some countries are seen
as more liable to frustrate resolution than others: fingers
are often pointed at procedural obstacles in Italy, and
the German practice of threatening firms with a greater
tax bill if they trigger a MAP (Interview 9; Hyde and
Thomas 2016). A list of complaints from businesses in
2015 includes that “competent authorities demonstrate
little willingness to compromise,” and “some countries
have also allowed MAP cases to remain pending for 8 to
10 years with no obvious prospect of resolution in the
near term.”3
As Glaxosmithkline found to the cost of $3.1 billion,
MAPs ending in stalemate can be expensive (Green 2006).
In that case, which came to a head in 2006, the UK and
United States disagreed over which country had the right
to the taxable profits from drugs that were developed in the
UK, but marketed and distributed in the United States.
From the perspective of theUK’s tax authority, most of the
value was generated by research and development in the
UK, while the IRS reportedly took the view that the
U.S. affiliate bore all the risk of the venture, and as a result
should be compensated for its success. As one commentary
on the case argued, “it is becoming increasingly evident
that what is needed is some form of binding arbitration
requirement, rather than the current quaint ‘we’ll try to
help you out if we can’ arrangement” (Green 2006, 3).
Mandatory binding tax treaty arbitration is an insti-
tutional innovation that definitively curbs state sover-
eignty in dispute settlement. Where states cannot reach
agreement through a MAP within a specified time limit,
either the taxpayer or one of the states involved can refer
the disagreement to a panel of independent tax practi-
tioners, whose decision will be binding on both states.
The rules vary, but typically each state nominates one or
two arbitrators, who then choose the panel chair. Arbi-
trations take place in secret, and those involved are
bound to confidentiality, but all the experienced arbitra-
tors we are aware of are eminent tax lawyers in private
practice or academia.
This transnational judicialization is the most pertinent
innovation taking global tax governance in a neoliberal,
constitutional direction since the 1970s. This is because it
makes existing institutions more enforceable for trans-
national capital, at a supranational level, where previously
states could only be held to international tax commitments
by their own domestic courts. Certainly, when states faced
public and political demands to make multinationals pay
more tax, international institutions discouraged them
from acting unilaterally. But those institutions predate
the neoliberal era of globalization. In contrast, tax
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arbitration is a recent shift that represents a hardening of
states’ obligations, in the interests of transnational capital.
Fiscal Sovereignty as an Enduring Obstacle
The emergence of tax arbitration should be seen in the
context of states’ reluctance to allow supranational insti-
tutions to encroach onto their fiscal sovereignty. In con-
trast, they have been more willing to cede ground to
transnational judicial processes in other areas of economic
law. There is a clear tension between the neoliberal state’s
impulse to bind its own hands to protect free markets, and
its attachment to its taxing powers. Perhaps most tellingly,
taxation is one area in which states of the otherwise highly
integrated European Union have been unwilling to pool
sovereignty, and they still retain their vetoes to this day.
International relations scholarship observes that states are
willing to tolerate suboptimal outcomes from inter-
national institutions because they are reluctant to cede
sovereignty over fiscal policy. For example, Ronen Palan
notes that tax havens are an artefact of traditional West-
phalian sovereignty norms (Palan 2003). For Thomas
Rixen, rules on international taxation “are chosen in such
a way as to interfere as little as possible with national tax
laws … The tax treaty regime is built on sovereignty-
preserving cooperation” (Rixen 2010).
In the realist tradition, the relationship between tax-
ation and war makes tax sovereignty a key component of
statehood itself. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes ascribes to
the sovereign the right “to levy mony upon the Subjects”
to fund the making of war, while for Charles Tilly, tax
ultimately underwrote war financing, and was thus essen-
tial to the mechanism through which “war made the state”
(Hobbes 1994, 134; Tilly 1992, 85). The state’s claim to a
monopoly over the right to tax led Douglass North to
define the state as “an organization with a comparative
advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area
whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax
constituents” (North 1981, 21).
Fiscal sociologists such as Rudolf Goldscheid and
Joseph Schumpeter add to this a notion of fiscal contract,
a relationship of mutual accountability between state and
citizens that emerged when those paying tax revenues
demanded the creation of a public financial realm separate
from the ruler’s private finances (Goldscheid 1958;
Schumpeter 1918). Even Jean Bodin, famous for his
conception of the absolutist state that could impose its
will on all subjects regardless of their consent, found the
limit to kingly power in taxation (Wolfe 1968). As Mar-
garet Levi argued, compliance with the state’s tax demands
is “quasi-voluntary” and relies on a social contract with
citizens as well as enforcement threats (Levi 1988). So
dominant is this view that many cross-country studies use
the tax share of GDP as a proxy for state capacity and
autonomy from private elites (Slater, Smith, and Nair
2014). It follows that states will cleave to their taxing
powers because they are a key component of both domes-
tic and international sovereignty.
The interests of transnational capital are not, however,
diametrically opposed to those of the state that seeks to
retain sovereignty. Businesses and other private actors
benefit from the ambiguities and inconsistencies between
national tax systems created by an emphasis on sovereignty
preservation. These gaps and mismatches create manifold
opportunities for tax planning, which, along with com-
plexity inherent to transfer pricing and the proliferation of
disputes, have spurned a large and well-remunerated
international tax advisory profession with a vested interest
in maintaining the system as it is (Büttner and Thiemann
2017; Picciotto 2015). The regime also leaves states free to
compete using tax rates, exemptions, and other rules.
We understand advocacy for tax arbitration as an
attempt to hold onto these benefits, ensuring the regime’s
ongoing viability and minimizing the attendant costs to
businesses. It reinforces tax stability by hardening states’
commitments to treaties and transfer pricing rules, but it
also mitigates the threat that they will adopt much more
integrated tax rules that would close off opportunities for
tax avoidance and pressure for tax competition. Yet these
same sovereignty-preserving design elements also meant
that tax arbitration had to be pursued in incremental steps.
Business Power and Path Dependence
Slobodian and Gill describe how states have proactively
cooperated to create institutions to tie their own hands,
rather than merely acquiescing to market discipline. To
understand how business power achieves this aim
requires moving beyond a structural power framing
focused on competition, and indeed Slobodian’s account
focuses on the influential role of key intellectuals. There
are two aspects of international tax institutions that make
such an approach especially necessary. To begin with,
capital-rich states’ preferences in international negoti-
ations are frequently a function of business interests, in
combination (or in tension) with a desire to maximize
revenue. International cooperation allows them to rec-
oncile capital’s desire for a lower effective tax rate with the
state’s own need for resources, by instead limiting multi-
nationals’ overseas tax burdens. This can be seen in their
pursuit of bilateral tax treaties with capital-importing
countries, the effect of which is to shield their ownMNEs
from modes of taxation that are not “acceptable,” as well
as to transfer some of the cost of relieving double taxation
onto the fisc of the capital importer (Dagan 2000;
Hearson 2021). It can also be seen in the United States’
general approach towards multilateral negotiations, in
which it seeks to maximize its own ability to tax inbound
and outbound capital, while minimizing other states’
ability to tax U.S. outbound multinationals and their
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own private citizens’ wealth held in the United States
(Hakelberg 2020).
Furthermore, the actors negotiating these international
tax instruments frequently transcend the state/market
boundary. U.S. representatives in international negoti-
ations are drawn on a temporary basis from District of
Columbia law firms, where they advise multinationals on
how to limit their tax bills. While European countries tend
to be represented by career civil servants, it is common for
these officials to leave government to become lobbyists and
advisers for multinational firms. The OECD Secretariat,
too, draws its staff from both public and private sectors.
The most influential voices in international tax debates are
often those who can speak the language of international tax
law, and leverage the experiences of a varied career
(Christensen 2019; Picciotto 2015; Seabrooke andWigan
2016). Members of the transnational policy community
on either side of the state/business divide often have more
in common than they do with non-specialists from their
own constituency (Hearson 2021). In short, business
power in international taxation manifests as the instru-
mental power through which capital influences the devel-
opment of soft law institutions, as well as the disciplining
power of capital markets that encourages their adoption by
states as hard law.
The mechanisms of business power take time to bear
fruit. But they take longer in international tax cooperation
because of the lock-in effect created by regime design
choices that date back to the 1920s and 1930s (Rixen
2011). Literature on the international tax regime portrays
its institutions as unusually resistant to change. Its
sovereignty-preserving design is decentralized, allowing
states the freedom to conclude bilateral tax treaties with
whomever, and on whatever terms, they prefer. Sover-
eignty preservation is one of the regime’s normative
characteristics, weaponized by tax havens when the
OECD first tried to curb their harmful tax competition
(Sharman 2006). OECD members, as a cartel of capital
exporters, have a strong vested interest in maintaining
institutions that constrain the taxing powers of countries
in capital importing mode, in spite of those institutions’
imperfections (Genschel and Rixen 2015).
How then can subversive actors overcome this resist-
ance? There are several “transition paths” that could guide
states in such a direction (Woll 2008). First, “subversive”
interests with a desire for fundamental reforms, but con-
fronting strong state veto points, can keep up a drumbeat
over time that the thing that states want (in this case, to
eliminate double taxation while preserving sovereignty) is
better achieved by alternative means. Thus, they pledge
fealty to the states’ goals, disguise their true preference for
change, and burrow from within, advocating for new
mechanisms layered on top of old ones that will help them
achieve their actual goals (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).
Such was the experience of leftist community health
activists under Brazil’s dictatorship, who took advantage
of the government’s desire for greater penetration into the
countryside to drive decentralization and universalization
of rural health care (Falleti 2010). Non-state actors can
thus appeal to a given regime’s purpose and convince states
that their fix will serve the original intentions better.
Second, subversives can appeal to values outside of a
specific regime purpose. For instance, during the neo-
liberal period, the idea of bringing market values and
disciplines into the state—such as through cost-benefit
analysis—has had broad appeal. Indeed, as economies
have become more financialized, policymakers and the
public increasingly believe that efficiency is a paramount
goal, but markets are so complex that their governance
must be left to (often private) experts (Johal, Moran, and
Williams 2014). Likewise, as gridlock makes dispute
resolution through political means more elusive, the reli-
ance placed on legalized and judicialized dispute settle-
ment increases. Such mechanisms are also justified for
their efficiency and promotion of the idea of “rule of law”
(Abbott et al. 2000; Alter, Hafner-Burton, and Helfer
2019). Reforms that advance economic or legal values that
states have internalized are easier to sell.
Third, subversives can emphasize that sovereignty
cession is not an “all or nothing” proposition. Sover-
eignty is a bundle of powers that can be disaggregated
and pooled for some functions but not others. It can, for
instance, be distinguished by whether it refers to control
domestically over borders and internal territory, or to
freedom from kinetic or legal coercion by other states
(Krasner 2001). Several leading contributions in the tax
literature, moreover, distinguish between de facto and de
jure sovereignty (Dietsch and Rixen 2014; Rixen 2008:
26–29). Indeed, in practice, the severability and malle-
ability of sovereignty is what has produced a patchwork
of power-sharing between federations, confederations,
and other international hierarchies (Mcconaughey,
Musgrave, and Nexon 2018).
This feature of sovereignty means that nations can pre-
serve their executive and legislative sovereignty, ceding only
their judicial sovereignty. This can seem lower stakes and
doesn’t compete with the prerogatives of the actors that
must agree to the change. Indeed, court systems tend to
accrete their power—as anti-federalists warned in the
United States’ own early constitutional debates—“by
insensible degrees.” This was precisely because judges exer-
cise their power “in cases which arise between individuals,
with which the public will not be generally acquainted.One
adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this to a
following one [even though] these cases will immediately
affect individuals only” (Brutus 1788). This enables a slow-
moving but steady march towards judicial review and even
judicial supremacy, all from what seem like low-stakes
decisions. For instance, the European Court of Justice
asserted the (not previously agreed) power of review of
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national court decisions over a $3 unpaid electric bill (Alter
2003). Yet, especially when the choice of who has access to
the judicial processes is not the executive’s to make, outside
actors can quickly ramp up the production of legal rules and
precedents in ways the initial “agreers” did not expect
(Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000).
Indeed, a turn towards the judicial is logical for subver-
sive business interests. It is in businesses’ interest to shift
the space of contestation into more technocratic, less
visible spheres, since politicization can be intensely hostile
to capital’s interests (Bell and Hindmoor 2013). Resolving
disputes through judicialized proceedings in camera is a
prime example of what Culpepper (2016) calls “quiet
politics.”
Alternative Explanations and the Problem of Timing
We have argued that the global tax regime of institutions
that constrain states in their efforts to tax multinational
firms is best seen as an elite project, developed by a
community of individuals in government and the private
sector. It is also sticky, due to its design features and
normative underpinnings. As such, instrumental business
power is fundamental to incremental change within the
regime, just as it was to its creation.
Before we demonstrate how the emergence of tax
arbitration supports this argument, we now briefly con-
sider three alternative hypotheses that, in isolation, are
unable to explain the pattern of change. Our purpose here
is not to demonstrate that these elements played no role in
the process we describe, but that they are insufficient
explanations on their own. The rest of the article will
demonstrate how our explanation adds to them to create a
better fit with the empirical data.
Two of these hypotheses suggest that states adopted tax
arbitration as part of an incremental progression in the
direction of more sovereignty-constraining commitments
by states. The first is the widespread erosion of sovereignty
as a norm in economic policy, as part of an ongoing trend
towards the legalization and in particular the judicializa-
tion of international relations (Abbott et al. 2000; Alter,
Hafner-Burton, andHelfer 2019) as well as the emergence
of new constitutionalism (Gill 1998). The second is the
intensification of competition for FDI, which has created
pressure for states to adopt capital-friendly tax policies and
international agreements (Barthel and Neumayer 2012;
Clausing 2016; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006).
While the emergence of tax arbitration seems consistent
with both these trends, they cannot explain why states’
attitudes to tax arbitration at a given time are frequently
misaligned with the broader direction of travel in global
economic governance. Strong pressure for tax arbitration
at the turn of the 1980s produced no results, even though
this was a moment when the structural power of capital
was strong (Blyth 2002), and the United States would be
governed for over a decade by administrations with a pro-
capital economic ideology (Pierson and Hacker 2008;
Prasad 2018). For example, the United States began to
negotiate bilateral investment treaties that included
investor-state arbitration in 1981, and by the mid-1990s
it was committed to enforceable arbitration regimes that
could be—and were—used against it: the 1993 NAFTA
agreement included an investor-state dispute settlement
procedure, followed by state-state arbitration through the
WTO’s dispute settlement understanding in 1995. Yet
business advocates of tax arbitration could find no traction
until a decade later, in the mid-2000s. They also struggled
in the European Union, where sovereignty-constraining
cooperation was intensifying overall in the 1970s and
1980s, but an arbitration proposal made in 1976 was
kicked into the long grass for over a decade.
Recent events further underline this timing mismatch.
The United States insisted on widespread commitments to
tax arbitration in OECD negotiations during 2019 and
2020. Yet this was a time when the Trump administration,
elected on a platform emphasizing sovereignty over glo-
balization, was actively undermining other arbitration
regimes at NAFTA and theWTO to the point of collapse.
New agreements subjecting states to arbitration, such as
the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,
have also been abandoned since 2016. The principle of
tax arbitration was embraced by most OECD states in
2017, in spite of an upsurge in nationalist politics: the UK,
which voted to leave the European Union in part over
concerns about judicial sovereignty, has been an enthusi-
astic supporter of tax arbitration. Support for arbitration
across the OECD also appears anomalous in the
post-financial crisis tax cooperation landscape, which has
been characterized by a break from the race to the bottom
and an emphasis on limiting tax avoidance and evasion
(Christensen and Hearson 2019; Hakelberg and Rixen
forthcoming; Mason 2020).
A third explanation is political partisanship, which does
not presume a linear trend towards capital-friendly tax
policies, expecting them to be supported in the United
States by Republican administrations and resisted by
Democratic ones (Campbell 2009). This might explain
why the pro-free trade Clinton administration was willing
to agree to arbitration in two major trade agreements,
NAFTA and the WTO, but not to tax arbitration. Yet, as
we will demonstrate, the Democrats in Congress in 2006
were if anything more enthusiastic for sovereignty-
constraining arbitration than the Bush administration,
and the Obama administration was also an active cham-
pion of tax arbitration beyond the commitments it
inherited from Bush. Furthermore, many arbitration
advocates were Democratic donors.
To solve the timing puzzle, we will focus on how
instrumental business power acting against institutional
rigidity produced an incremental change. Put simply, it
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took longer for private interests to achieve their objective
in tax cooperation because of the normative and formal
institutional obstacles that needed to be overcome. Those
obstacles dictated a mechanism of incremental change
through layering.
The Rise of Tax Arbitration
In this section, we review the development of international
taxation institutions over the last half century, showing
how the loosening of capital restrictions at the end of
Bretton Woods created tensions that eventually led to the
emergence of tax arbitration, through an incremental
process. Our account focuses on the United States. This
choice reflects its status as the lone “great power” with the
ability to instigate—or block—radical change in the insti-
tutions of global tax cooperation (Hakelberg 2020). The
online appendix gives an historical account of the regime’s
creation and elaboration from the 1920s to the 1960s.
Cracks Emerge in the International Tax Regime
The early 1970s was the beginning of a period of intense
growth in cross-border capital flows, as the BrettonWoods
system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls fell
apart. This transformation did not only place pressure on
the institutions created at the Bretton Woods conference,
but also on international tax rules that had been drawn up
decades earlier at the League of Nations and inherited by
the OECD (Picciotto 1992). In a series of reports, the
League’s Fiscal Committee had laid the foundations of an
enduring regime to tackle the problem of “double
taxation” that occurred when multinational investors
faced conflicting claims to tax their income from the
different countries in which they operated. The League’s
solution was premised on two key fragmentations. First,
rather than a single binding multilateral agreement, inter-
national tax rules comprised a network of binding bilateral
agreements, standardized through multilateral models.
Second, in the eyes of tax authorities, multinational
taxpayers were separated into individual entities, each of
which was taxed as if it were independent, trading with
other parts of the multinational group at arm’s length.
This is the system known as “transfer pricing”. An alter-
native approach rejected by the League was unitary tax-
ation with formulary apportionment, which would have
treated multinationals as holistic entities whose profits
were allocated between states according to a formula.
As cross-border capital flows increased, states began to
compete to attract mobile capital. Businesses and wealthy
individuals exploited tax treaties and transfer pricing tech-
niques to arbitrage between them,moving their income on
paper to the jurisdictions in which they faced the lowest
taxation. Tax havens—specializing in attracting this
capital—began to emerge (Palan 2003). “As an unin-
tended consequence of its institutional setup,” argues
Rixen, “the tax regime, which originally only dealt with
double tax avoidance, endogenously creates under-
taxation” (Rixen 2011, 220).
Yet the regime’s design hamstrung states’ response:
hundreds of bilateral treaties, and a superstructure of soft
international and hard national laws built on them, could
not easily be dismantled and replaced with a new regime
based on different principles. As a senior British tax official
wrote, regarding some of the pressures created by early
capital account liberalization in the UK, “thirty years of
history … effectively preclude us from taking [another]
course. We cannot now go back to square one” (Lord
1967). Furthermore, the major capital-exporting states
recognized that the present system, though imperfect,
gave them large advantages over capital importers
(Genschel and Rixen 2015).
By the end of the decade, calls for reform were growing.
Unitary taxation began to proliferate among U.S. states,
which began to require “combined reporting” from multi-
nationals so that they could assess their share of global
profits with a formula instead of relying on transfer pricing
(Picciotto 1992). While blessed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the move irritated foreign governments (Weissman
1983). When the Reagan administration pushed states to
accommodatemultinationals, subfederal officials testified to
Congress that this “may unreasonably restrict state fiscal
sovereignty and deprive the states of significant revenue”
(U.S. Congress 1984, 16). It was President Clinton who
pressured a watering down, such that states are only per-
mitted to use formulary apportionment to sort out tax owed
between themselves, not beyond the “water’s edge” of the
nation state (McNeill 1994).
The work of Palan, Picciotto, and Rixen makes a
compelling case that institutional rigidity prevented rad-
ical reforms, such as unitary taxation, that might have
addressed the tax haven problem. But there was another
issue: the bilateral regime was increasingly failing to elim-
inate double taxation, the function for which it was
designed. As capital mobility increased, multinational
taxpayers increasingly ran up against gaps in the rules’
ability to manage the interface between different countries’
tax systems. A European Commission document from
1973 laid out the difficulties created by the growth of
multinational companies:
The area of taxation probably best reveals the inadequacy of
nationally-devised systems supplemented by bilateral agreements
for tackling the phenomen [sic] of the growth of multinational
undertakings. The coexistence of different non-harmonized tax
systems complicates and even often penalizes the international
functioning of an undertaking. (European Commission 1973)
Unitary taxation might have eliminated this problem too,
but with that proposal off the table, proposals for trans-
national tax arbitration began to emerge.
In 1979, the Business and Industry Advisory Commit-
tee to the OECD (BIAC, composed of multinational
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companies) expressed its dissatisfaction with the time-
consuming and uncertain nature of existing procedures
to resolve tax disputes between states (OECD 1984, para.
36). In the OECD’s words, “MNEs expressed the view
that no topic was more directly concerned with the entire
area of transfer pricing” and that “as things are, taxpayers
might be exposed to heavy burdens of tax and vulnerable
to arbitrary and capricious pricing adjustments by exam-
ining revenue agents” (OECD 1984, para. 25). BIAC’s
advocacy for mandatory and binding dispute settlement in
such cases was echoed in a series of studies and reports
published by the World Association of Lawyers of World
Peace through Law (1979), International Fiscal Associ-
ation (1981), and International Chambers of Commerce
(1984).
The late 1970s and 1980s would at first sight appear to
be an ideal time for such ideas to bear fruit, according to
the alternative explanations mentioned earlier. The demise
of Bretton Woods had demonstrated that states could no
longer ignore the structural power of capital, which had
further intensified as cross-border markets and the finan-
cial sector expanded. States began pooling sovereignty to
facilitate cross-border capital flows. This was perhaps most
evident in the European Union, which adopted the
European Monetary System in 1979, followed by the
Single European Act in 1985. The latter promoted the
interests of capital through both liberalized economic
policy and pooled political sovereignty, expanding the
number of policy areas in which states’ vetoes were
eliminated. By the end of the decade, both the EU and
OECD had adopted instruments promoting capital
account liberalization. As for political partisanship, right
wing governments in the United States and UK pursued
aggressive pro-capital agendas, including the “big bang” in
financial services. All the signs were good for arbitration,
and indeed, during this time states began negotiations
through which they would eventually commit to binding
dispute settlement in both trade and investment treaties.
Yet advocates of arbitration in the tax sphere were to
draw a blank. The OECD noted the “strength of interest”
in the topic among the business community but rejected it
on grounds of the “unacceptable surrender of fiscal
sovereignty” entailed (OECD1984, para. 115). Unwilling
to adopt either mandatory binding arbitration or unitary
taxation, it instead opted for a sticking plaster approach
that maximized sovereign discretion: enhancing the semi-
diplomatic mutual agreement procedure (MAP), a nego-
tiated approach to resolving disagreements over treaty
interpretation and transfer pricing rules. Although the role
for such a procedure had been foreseen as far back as the
League of Nations, it was strengthened and its remit
expanded.
In Brussels, the European Commission had identified
the double taxation problem in its “Action Programme for
Taxation,” which sought to promote “tax conditions
which would enable the highest possible degree of liber-
alization in the movement of persons, goods, service and
capital and of interpenetration of economies” (European
Commission 1975, 2). In 1976 it unsuccessfully proposed
a Directive obliging states to submit outstanding cases of
double taxation to be resolved through binding arbitra-
tion. The Arbitration Directive did not gain support from
member states, because enforcement would have ultim-
ately been placed under the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ). A tax lawyer who had followed the
EU debates at the time explained the difficulty thus:
The problem with arbitration is you give jurisdiction to decide
the tax base away. Some states are extremely squeamish about
this. In its heart, in its DNA, you do give authority to decide the
assessment away. Some jurisdictions were dead against giving
authority to the ECJ. (Interview 9)
It would be well over a decade before the Directive
eventually reemerged as a Convention, which states were
willing to accept because it fell outside the purview of the
ECJ. According to a European Commission official, “the
legal form was a political decision made byMember States,
which has been based on the collective hesitation to
surrender a significant part of their fiscal sovereignty
[to the ECJ]” (Schelpe 1995).
The Convention left intact so much sovereign discre-
tion that it was not a success. The lack of procedural
obligations created opportunities for obstruction by
imposing vexatious penalties, for example, on companies
that could be waived in return for not triggering arbitral
proceedings. “Actually, it wasn’t working at all, because
the countries wouldn’t let you go in,” according to a tax
practitioner (Interview 9). As a result, arbitrated disputes
within the EU were small in number: tacit knowledge
among interviewees and in the industry press suggests as
few as four disputes in total by the mid-2010s (Sharon
2012). The initial experiences with arbitrations were slow,
messy, and expensive (European Commission 2003;
Moses 2010). By the end of 2013, 432 active MAP cases
in the EU had passed the two-year time limit at which
arbitration proceedings should have been triggered, but
only one was in arbitration (European Commission
2014).
Across the Atlantic, U.S. Treasury officials also paid lip
service to arbitration while retaining full autonomy. In
1990 they committed to “limited and controlled” arbitra-
tion of disputes with Germany, an entirely voluntary
approach that “in no way impinges upon the sovereignty
of either contracting state” (U.S. Congress 1990, 20).
Once triggered, all parties would have to comply with
the decision, but both states had to agree to initiate the
arbitration in advance, as did the taxpayer. Furthermore,
the underlying tax policy or domestic tax law couldn’t be at
stake. They viewed it as an “experiment… If it works well
in Germany, it may be worth considering in some other
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treaties” (ibid. 39). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) endorsed the
model, but the latter warned that “we trust that both
countries will routinely give their consent to arbitration”
(ibid. 51). This proved to be the proposal’s Achilles heel,
and no U.S.-Germany disputes ever occurred. In 1992,
Robin Beran, Corporate Tax Director of Caterpillar Inc.,
wrote an open letter to the International Tax Counsel of
the IRS stating that “multinational corporations who have
contended with uncertainty … need an arbitration
requirement as a safeguard to double taxation” (Beran
1992, emphasis added).
The Neoliberal Project Bears Fruit
By 1995, most OECD members had taken only tentative
steps towards binding tax arbitration, even as they had
embraced the principle at the WTO, NAFTA, and in a
growing number of investment treaties. The OECD
proposed to “analyse again and in more detail” the ques-
tion of tax arbitration, but it moved at a glacial pace
(OECD 1995, 62). A decade later, in 2004, it could only
promise more study (OECD 2004). By 2007, a proposal
for binding arbitration finally emerged, included in the
2008 revision of the OECD model tax convention. This
form of arbitration provided for the “mandatory resolution
of unresolved MAP issues,” and stipulated that the out-
come would be “binding on both Contracting States”
(OECD 2007, 5).
The main reason for the change of OECD line was the
thawing of the U.S. position. In 2006, the Bush admin-
istration had unveiled a proposal for mandatory binding
arbitration, initially in treaties with Germany and Bel-
gium. In contrast to the 1990 U.S.–Germany agreement,
the proposed rules would prevent either state from vetoing
the formation of a board once MAP talks dragged past two
years. Instead, the formation of a panel could only be
blocked if both states agreed, thereby erasing unilateral
foot dragging as a viable tactic. Gone was the technical
commentary that the underlying tax policy or domestic tax
law couldn’t be at issue. Investors were more powerful still:
unlike the states, they could block the formation of a board
beforehand, and reject its decision once rendered.
Treasury officials predicted that the new provisions
could lead to companies making more complaints of
double taxation because they would now know the dispute
would get resolved” (U.S. Congress 2007, 10). Tax staff
for Congress celebrated the provisions as a means of
disciplining government, “intended to induce the compe-
tent authorities to moderate their positions, including
before arbitration proceedings would commence, thus
increasing the possibility of a negotiated settlement”
(Ibid, 22). The NFTC backed up the assessment: “We
think having the arbitration process, if you will, hanging
over their heads will lead to better-and more efficient-
competent-authority work, which is a fine outcome. And,
failing that, the arbitration process is also a fine outcome”
(Ibid, 40).
Our interviews and commentary in the industry press
highlight two elements that contributed to this change.
First, a “subversive”—a tax lawyer from private practice
with a history of lobbying on behalf of multinational
firms—took on the role of “Director, International” at
the IRS in 2000. Interviewees and contemporaneous
industry press considered Carol Dunahoo as instrumental
in driving the change of position (Interviews 2,4,7; Bell
2007; Turner 2005). Prior to the IRS, Dunahoo worked at
PricewaterhouseCoopers, from where she acted on behalf
of various U.S. business lobbying groups, including the
International Tax Policy Forum—on whose behalf she
testified before Congress—and the Electronic Commerce
Tax Study Group. Almost as soon as she left the IRS in
2004, she authored a report for the NFTC that advocated
tax arbitration among a range of business-friendly tax
reforms (National Foreign Trade Council 2005). Her
co-author, Mary Bennett, would go on to lead the
OECD’s adoption of arbitration in its model treaty, as
head of its secretariat’s Tax Treaties and Transfer Pricing
division. As Dunahoo explained:
The problem is that the competent authority process is presently
the only means of ensuring that countries honor their treaty
obligations. And it does not require the competent authorities to
reach agreement within a reasonable timeframe on a reasonable
basis, or even to agree at all. It provides no recourse, even where
one of the countries simply declines to enter into discussions on a
case or an issue. There is no mechanism to ensure that the
competent authority process—and, therefore, the treaty—
operate as intended. (cited in Bell 2004)
A second factor in the emergence of the Bush proposal
was the sovereignty-preserving design championed by
Dunahoo and colleagues, which allowed it to be seen as
an incremental development in comparison to the non-
binding arbitration provisions. The new treaties’ accom-
panying guidance stipulated that arbitrators would not
produce written awards or provide legal reasoning. Their
role was reduced to picking which state’s tax law inter-
pretation was correct. This system, called “last best offer”
or “baseball” arbitration (based on the procedure used to
resolve pay disputes in major league baseball), was
designed to get states to put their most considered offers
on the table, and to minimize the creation of a body of case
law (Park 2001). According to one U.S. tax treaty nego-
tiator, it was after examining the baseball-style approach,
with its sovereignty-preserving elements, that the United
States became more open to arbitration (Henry Louie,
cited in Parillo and Gupta 2015). “It would have been
harder to get Congress to approve” a “reasoned opinion”
approach to arbitration, stated one former Treasury official
(Interview 7). Another former official added that
“baseball” arbitration helped because “a whole phase of
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turning the battleship around was getting Congress willing
to ratify” (Interview 2).
It is worth noting here that, while this change took
place under a Republican administration, it had biparti-
san support. Many of the key players in the move
towards arbitration—including the leadership of the
NFTC—are Democratic donors.3 Moreover, congres-
sional Democrats were pushing Bush’s Treasury Depart-
ment even further down the path to judicialization. In
the official Senate report, the Democratic majority on
the Senate Finance Committee urged the administration
to consider that “in the context of a treaty relationship
that is more contentious, providing the arbitration
board's decisions with precedential value might be desir-
able in order to avoid arbitrating the same dispute
repeatedly” (U.S. Congress 2007, 7). In the hearings,
Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) called for “the possibility
of taxpayer participation in the arbitration proceedings”
(ibid., 33, 47). The NFTC agreed, praising the sugges-
tion as a way that companies “might have some influence
with the tax authorities” (ibid., 47). The bipartisan
element is illustrated by the Obama administration’s
subsequent efforts to promote arbitration as an inter-
national norm at the OECD.
As with the earlier non-mandatory arbitration clauses,
the innovation of “baseball” arbitration seemed like a small
enough step to be palatable to government and Congress,
but it left the door open to subsequent layering that would
chip away at sovereignty-preserving elements of its design.
The layering was mutually reinforcing between
Washington, DC, Brussels, and Paris. The U.S. change
of policy allowed the OECD to endorse mandatory bind-
ing arbitration, but the process it proposed was more
judicialized by default, based on the “reasoned opinion”
approach. By 2009, the United States had already
imported a judicializing innovation from the OECD into
its own arbitration proceedings: treaties signed with
France and Switzerland that year gave taxpayers limited
standing, inviting them to submit their own position
papers to arbitration panels, which was not possible under
the earlier U.S. provisions.
From 2013 to 2015, the Obama administration sup-
ported an agreement on arbitration as part of the
G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative
(BEPS) project on corporate tax avoidance, which would
eventually be implemented by twenty-seven countries in
2017 as part of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument. In
2016, the U.S. Model Convention was updated to include
mandatory binding arbitration as the default in
U.S. negotiations with all countries.
The incremental progress towards more binding arbi-
tration was further underlined in 2017, when the
European Council agreed to replace its Convention with
a Directive that has a wider scope and is enforceable in the
European Court of Justice, precisely the sacrifice of
sovereignty that member states had rejected forty years
before. It is the first tax arbitration agreement to require
that, at a minimum, decision abstracts be published. The
European Commission Communication that paved the
way for this change noted ruefully that early design
decisions prevented more radical reform: elimination of
the transfer pricing system altogether “would eliminate the
risk of double taxation in the EU,” but because of lock-in
of such fundamental design decisions, strengthening the
arbitration convention was a necessary second-best solu-
tion (European Commission 2015, 11).
This head of steam behind tax arbitration is difficult for
alternative explanations, as it coincides with a broader
context of economic nationalism that has united left-
and right-wing governments behind policies that retain
national sovereignty and are often detrimental to capital as
a result. The U.S. and UK administrations have aggres-
sively pursued withdrawal from sovereignty-pooling insti-
tutions against the preferences of capital, yet have been
strong advocates of more tax arbitration. Judicial sover-
eignty was an explicit theme of the Brexit campaign, while
opposition to the TTIP was frequently framed around its
investor-state dispute settlement provisions. The Trump
administration has specifically targeted the WTO’s dis-
pute settlement procedures by refusing to approve new
judges.
The direction of travel for tax arbitration is not only an
exception in the arbitration sphere, but also for taxation,
where it is a lone capital-friendly reform since the financial
crisis, among ambitious efforts by the OECD and EU to
raise more tax revenue by addressing tax evasion and
avoidance by cross-border capital. On the tax evasion side,
financial secrecy has been radically curbed through the
OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information, which is backed by the threat of G20 and EU
sanctions. It monitors tax havens for their compliance with
standards, notably a new system through which bulk data
on taxpayers’ foreign income is exchanged between juris-
dictions. This anti-evasion capability appears to have
emboldened governments to increase taxes on capital
income (Hakelberg and Rixen forthcoming).
As for tax avoidance, the 2017 arbitration agreement
was wrapped up in the OECD’s BEPS initiative, triggered
primarily by the growing “perception that the domestic
and international rules on the taxation of cross-border
profits are now broken and that taxes are only paid by the
naïve” (OECD 2013, 13). The Obama administration,
committed to closing off opportunities for tax avoidance in
the U.S. tax code, was initially supportive, but soon found
itself fighting a rearguard action against measures targeted
primarily at increasing U.S. multinationals’ tax payments
to other governments (Hakelberg 2020). Business was
highly dissatisfied with the initiative, apart from the
inclusion of arbitration: the NFTC testified to Congress
that it was “politically driven and we believe, appeared to
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be aimed more at raising revenue from U.S.-based multi-
national corporations (MNEs) rather than other global
companies” (U.S. Congress 2015, 56).
By 2019, the global promulgation of tax arbitration
provisions beyond the OECD became a priority for
U.S. businesses, even as unfinished business from the
BEPS project snowballed into a protracted negotiation
over new rules to tax the digital economy. A statement
from the U.S. Council for International Business set this
out:
The OECD should require any country that wishes to be part of
the new consensus to adopt mandatory binding arbitration, with
peer review, as a minimum standard to resolve any disputes
arising as a result of the new rules. (Sample 2020)
They had fully converted the U.S. government, and
negotiators let it be known that this position was also a red
line for the Trump administration (Bulusu and Ali 2019).
Arbitration is now a major fault line in global negotiations,
with emergingmarkets and developing countries continuing
to cite sovereignty as their main objection (Johnston 2019;
Lewis 2016). Proposals currently under discussion to satisfy
U.S. demands would expand arbitration far beyond its
tentative steps through baseball arbitration. They would
create a new multilateral dispute settlement approach in
which affected countries would be bound by the decision
of panels whose formation they could not block, and on
which not all affecting countries would be able to appoint
members. Thus, the direction of travel for the United States,
EU, andOECD is clear. In 2019, a group of tax practitioners
met in London to celebrate the diffusion of tax arbitration
and promote the idea of a permanent tax arbitration tribunal.
One experienced arbitrator stated boldly that the proposal
would offer more of “what we already see developing: an
international common law of tax.”4
Conclusion
It took four decades since the first concerted efforts by
pro-judicialization subversives, but by 2017 mandatory
binding tax arbitration had become the norm for inter-
national tax cooperation, at least within the OECD. It
represents a transfer of fundamental attributes of sover-
eignty from domestic revenue authorities and courts to
private adjudicators. In many of the new clauses, tax-
payers have more rights of veto over the process than do
states. Indeed, the latest generation of treaties also has a
much greater role for non-state actors—with taxpayers
allowed in some cases to trigger the proceedings. Looked
at from a more practical perspective, the result is a net
transfer of revenue from governments (in double taxation
cases where they cannot agree among themselves) to
multinational taxpayers, who can now force a resolution
on them.
It is not only the change in position, but also the
timing of the change that we have sought to explain. The
period from the late 1970s through the 1990s is usually
regarded as the high watermark of neoliberal globaliza-
tion, in which the Reagan and Thatcher governments
recast the political consensus for a generation. Yet even
then, a strategy of incremental change was necessary.
States were only willing to concede arbitration on very
sovereignty-preserving terms, rendering it largely inef-
fective. In contrast, the period since the financial crisis of
2008 has been characterized in the West by a popular
backlash against neoliberal globalization and the failure
of capital-friendly judicialization projects such as the
Doha Round and the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership, not to mention Brexit. There has also
been a public clamor for stronger taxation of the wealthy
and multinational companies, which formed the back-
drop to major international progress on exchange of tax
information, as well as to the BEPS project. Yet it is
precisely in this era that tax arbitration, a pro-capital
reform, has finally come of age.
As we have argued, the timing difference came about
because efforts to promote arbitration took decades to
bear fruit. This was successful layering: the new regime is
the old regime, with an arbitration scheme on top.
“Subversives” encouraged states to adopt their preferred
outcome by convincing officials that doing so would
make the regime more effective at alleviating double
taxation, and that arbitration was a necessary cession of
the judicial slice of sovereignty in order to hold on to
other dimensions. When sovereignty-preserving arbitra-
tion designs failed to resolve the problem, more
sovereignty-constraining versions were now just a small
step away.
By combining insights from the business power, his-
torical institutionalist, and judicialization literatures, we
illuminated some of the concrete, often unobserved,
power dynamics that explain unlikely or unexpected shifts
in observable policies. If even the long-resistant United
States can cede sovereignty over the most sensitive policy
area, then we would expect to see ongoing sovereignty
cession in other policy areas that are characterized by
strong instrumental business power.
Finally, we offer a warning to policymakers—particularly
those from developing countries with less capacity to
shape the double taxation regime in its new era. As
recent literature shows, inequality today leads to cogni-
tive and actual capture of the state and policy discourse
today and tomorrow (Boushey 2019; Hertel-Fernandez
2019; Saez and Zucman 2019). While we hope that the
OECD’s BEPS process will help reduce tax avoidance, it
is likely that in doing so it will perpetuate a system that
continues to be exploited by MNEs, reducing pressure
for a more radical overhaul. As the OECD stated at the
project’s outset, “what is at stake is the integrity of the
corporate income tax” (OECD 2013, 10). Arbitration,
too, is a means of shoring up that system.
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Notes
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OECD BEPS ACTION 14.’” On file with authors.
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staff totaling over $60,000, seventy-eight were to Demo-
crats. Source: Center for Responsive Politics database.
4 Remark made at “An Evening with Tribute,” London,
September 9, 2019.
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